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The thesis analo [ise* the federal oil and
in the United State* to the oil cenec a gr
to foreign cil producers. To establish the analogy* it deaca lie
eral lease and the concession in & general way, noting
in the document* themselves and the physical fact* which moti
arties to enter into them. It e; in more detail t
nature of the domestic I^v applicable to the federal lease and
5 of foreign and multi-national law which might
overseas concession under various theories. .' da examination is , -•-
ticularly concerned v/ith the avenues by which municipal iavt forei
. country granting a concession may affect the ho die; cd i~». oo. . .
the rights of the producing company. Inasmuch as the ultimate < j
of the thesis is to assess the possible effects of certain aspects of
iv

America;* municipal law of the federal lease - law of the ovv.
concession.
The reoult of that assessment is the conclusion that Suprcv
Court decisions (notably Be v. Udall
.
373 U. S. 472 (1963) ) -
-*istrative cancellation of issued federal leases for causes not
.,.. .^.J.ws- by w-i-tate bode ill for the w*-acu../ o» the overseas concession,
as wel- a- -or title security unucr the federal leas - itiob*'. This leads
..,
. -.-.. -~v_— that tbc uu^'omi Co irt should, la aa appropriate
future opinion, correct such statements as might be subject to the
£ ^rotation abroad that American law endorses the sweeping th
of sovereignty by which states are prone to justify their unilateral modi-
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ADMINISTRATIVE CANCELLATION OF THE F _
OIL AND CAS LEASE: A SHOT HEARD
-SOUND THE WORLD?
INTRODUCTION
Two observations inspired the discussion to follow. One is
the similarity between the federal oil and gas lease on public lane
the United States and oil and gas concessions issued by foreign govern*
naenta to operator* within their borders. In beta, the parties arc c.
government on the one hand, and a private corporation or individual i
the other. The objectives of the parties are about the same and t!
documents they use to reach those objective© are similar. The o
observation is that the internal or municipal law of the United State g can
affect other bodies of law having a multi-national character. The infer**
ence to be drawn from these observations is that developments in
municipal law of the United States which defines the nature of the i
lease may somehow be echoed as analogous developments* in those o
bodies of law which, owing to the diverse nationalities of the parth.
fine the nature of the overseas concession.
The 1963 decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Booache v. Udall confirmed the Secretary of the Interior in his

cancellation of a federal oil and gas lease by purely administrative action
not specifically authorised in the statutory framework for the leasing of
I
public lands, la so doing, the Court altered, cxprocsly and by im* Ilea*
tioni . -v had been supposed to be the basic legal nature of the in,
held by a federal leasee* It is the task of this paper to character,
alteration in the federal leasee' a legal interest, to trace- the routes by
which it can affect the bodies of law defining the overseas cone.-.,
naire'e interest, and to assess those effects.
To accomplish its task, the paper undertakes to describe b
the concession and the federal lease in a general way, and to exam-:.
detail their legal natures as revealed by the bodies of law which se1 -
conditions of their existence. In the case of the overseas concession tl
requires a fairly lengthy discussion of the several bodies of law v naay
>ly# together with the occasions of their application. This done, &i
analogy between the federal leases and the concession established, t
discussion centers on the results which mi&ht actually be expected if the
Boesche decision sends ramifications into the le&al environment o:
overseas concession*
X 373U. S. 472 (1963).

LAV; OF THE OV^IiS^AS CONCESSION
Nature of the Concession
9 mineral resource* of the world, Including its hydrocay
ireeat, arc not uniformly distributed over its surface. Nor a;
tal rces held uniformly among the world's peoples* Geolc
cldent has put most of the world's petroleum in the M 'develc
nations, whose capital structures are unable to support V.
process of extraction* The industrialized, capital-rich nations
orally look outside their bor<3oi*a for Che diet of petroleum re -es
necessary to feed their economies. Those facts of life oa this
have given riao to International cooperation for the utilisation of c
or-:'-, rily evidenced by '*co;acosalons." Through the oil concession
capital- poor nation trades j>art of its oil for cash and tho economi elop«
ment obtainable through the ag«ncy of an oil company from a capital-ri
nation. Writers have been unable to reach agreement on the exact
of concession agreements* They are not treaties; only one of the parti
is a tstate* Yet, they have undeniable international aspects and I
.,
/*§ state will frequently have* at least an indirect hand In the per-
formance of concessions* Moreover, the effect of a concession aj
i* very iiiV.llur, i« ~>ocae senses, to the conveyance or an estate in real

4property.*" At any rate, it is an agreement, not something tho st;.
.—^ .0 choice about granting* If the granting state bad no discretion,
--
.. is not a true concession, in the ie&al aease* "Concession,"
then, is a poor word iar tae - „. . .... .ens, coano;,^ aj it doea tome
of compulsion applied to the granti-a,; su.te. Company executiv




''Economic development agreement" has been au
t .
eecma satiafactory* Nevertheless, thia paper v/iU continue the i
"Cv,--vV .ioa," which, io the most common appellation and haa wi .
the test of time, if not of logic*
The basic motivating force behind the concession is the exis-
tence ox natural resources the granting state wants to dispose of*
rally, it wants the maximum possible return, and the concession fa
2
Kissasr* In Leach, $ovcrzi~n Expropriation of Fro 'torS-'
Abrogation of Concession Contracts , 23 FORDHAM L* REV. 177, ^ .
(1959).
Carle ion. Interna tton?! K ole of Conco ?> a
^ffiVA^^iv^} cttn <,
NW. U. L. REV- 6la, 621 (1%7 )* citing . Huaaa, £cma Internal"
JLeg:el Aa -,.-.r:ts of tho Sue?, Canal Ov,> .. jtion , 61 AM, J* SJtFl L* 277 (1952).
4D. FINNIK, DESERT ENTERPRISE 20 {1<J5-;.
S
G. RAY* UVW GOVERNING CONTRACTS 0ETWSS1
AND FOREIGN NATIONALS 13 (I960) (reprint from PROCEEDH
"HIS 2%J INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE INVESTMENT ROADJftiereln*
after cited as RAY] .

been found to be the arrangement best suited to that end. An alter:.--
five to the concession, quite uniformly rejected, is to confer full owner-
ship of the resources on individuals, relying on their exercise of self*
interest to benefit the national economy generally?
An oil and gas concession in a grant by the state of the right
to seek, extract, and cell oil. The inducement offered the company is
the possibility of profit from oil production. The state also contributes
.ise of protection from interference during the search for
production of oil. In return, the company agrees to explore for oil and,
if it is found, to exchange it for money to as to give the state a ce:
share of the revenue. The state receives additional benefits, which,
while not always sought in the concession agreement, are necessarily
incident to it, An example is the increase in the pool of educated man*
power which results from the training the company provides to the em-
ployees it must hire locally.
Modern concession agreements ditfov in details, but they usually
contain provision for the following:
1. the privilege to explore for, extract, refine, and export oils
C&rlston, supra note Z, at 62 i.
7RAY 16.

62. ©orao initial time limit within which exploration must
begin;
3. an effective period* usually very long, e.g. sixty yeai
4. a description of the specific area tor which the conces-
sion is granted;
5. a right to establish system* of transportation and com*
muuicatioa;
6. the right to acquire land for company purposes}
7. supply by the company ©£ specific amounts of oil or
products for local consumption;
... the right to establish subsidiary companies;
9. payment by fcho company ei tho salaries o£ state repre*
sentatives appointed to deal with the company.
10. local hiring of labor, in no far as needed skills are
available;
1 It reports by the company on operations;
12. local offering of new stock ia&ue»;
1 3. arbitration,
14. payment formulas calling for (a) a lump cum when the co»«
cession is granted (bonne), (b) dead rent during exploration, and (c)
royalties based on the amount o£ oil produced and sold, or on profits*
'
*C. LENCZOWSKI, OIL AND STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Vho cvc?ic-w o-.„ concession U .i contract, but It Is alto
something more, li grants tho ri^ht to take and sell a wasting natu-
ral resource, and therefore gives not crJLv in oereoi-iaro contractual
right*, against the granting state, but also vests in ram interests '*.
-•
— property* Moreover, it involves state parties and largo for«
corporations. Its subject it a natural resource of unparalleled im-
portance and value to too entire civilised world* Thea i E icts glv i
I concession an inherently international character* which greatly
affects its legal nature*
T'co Governing Law
The public-nrivate, contract-convey -, domestic-inter;
tional : .nation of concession agreements has resulted in a
i
diversity of opinion among writers as to what law should proper!
to them* Cattan lists as possible choices the lex contract)
municipal law of tho contracting state, the principles of law cet.---
moa to the parties, the general principles of law recognised by civ;«
10
t public international law, and administrative law.





i ^i>l£ east and nqsth Africa (1W).
*S. SIKSEK. THS LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CIL CC
04 THE ARAB WORLD 3 (Middle East Oil Monograph No. 2, I960),
l0H, CATTAN, THE LAT* OIT OIL CONCESSIONS IN T
.ST AND NO£TH AFRICA 33 (1%7).

3- -uion to follow will omit a separate consideration of administra-
tive law. The features which set it apart from municipal law in gen-
eral are important only to civil lawyers, and are not important to the
purposes of this paper. Changing the sequence of Cattan'a listing,
the applicability of the municipal law of the contracting state will be
discussed first.
Since a concession is ordinarily negotiatedt signed, and per-
formed in the granting state, the most obvious choice of a body of law
to construe it is the domestic law of that state. Indeed, there is author-
ity for the proposition that it is the only possible choice. That thec
proceeds on the argument that there are only two kinds of law, inter-
national law and municipal law. Since international law applies c.
dealings between sovereign states, a concession contract necessarily
falls within the realm of municipal law. It has also been argue.
the domestic law of the contracting state should be presumed applicable
in the absence of a contrary expression of intent in the agreement.
Sec Kissam,& Leach, supra note 2, at 195.
* 2,,(l)t is generally admitted in private writernational law t
a sovereign State is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to h
subjected its undertaking to its own legal system . , . ." Saudi Aiv
Aramco Arbitration Award (1958), quoted in H. CATTAN, r,r-- -
10, at 39.

9concessions as*© often executed by states) having a. poorly develop
local j. jNTttdence^ and it is usually required, somehow, to brln^
.her body of law to resolve disputes.
I ublic international law ha© been argued to bo directly ftp - 1-
oablc wo *'.,- breach by a ovate of ita contract with an alien. * However,
.w? view is that no international wrong has been committed until
a -tats not only broaches a contract but ai„o denies the offended alien
s f
opportunity to have hie ease properly adjudicated. In juch a . lig-
ation the international wrong occurs not because international law ftp-
js to the contract, but because it forbids unjust treatment ©£ all n .
Professor Jennings has suggested that it is illusory as a practical
ter to say that international law coca not provide a direct, conl i
re^.-^,;y for etaie urencae- of contracts* He points cut that the fin
oC an international delict in a contract case requires a determinal
to whether the state acted arbitrarily. This determination neeeesi
construction of the contract to ascertain the rights it gives the
Thus, he feels an international law ol contracts may bo found "sec:
I 3Cca generally P. JSSSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAV* %l (U ).
^hlano # Str-to Contracts r,;! :f ^to R,cc;^:n^ib;Iv.ty, 54 AM. J.
INT«L L. 572, »90«-$l (i960).
'Amerasi *"V>he , £tate Breaches of Cor.tr ::
C
^ w I V




ia the interstices of the traditional delictual remedy." Neverthe-
less* the prevailing view is that international law is excluded by dell*
nition from application to cases not involving disputes betweca i. ; *.
International law rules may eater the arena ©£ concession disputes In*
directly* inasmuch as concession agreements alien specify international
13
law as an applicable body o£ law.
The lc:£ contractu:^ provides the most common rational© for
- .-retatioa of oil concessions. The theory is simply that the con*
tract coataias within it* either oacpsroasly or by incorporate.
.
,
legal rules accessary to its operation. ' The principle that the cc
is the law oi the parties has a very long and respectable history* It \
enunciated by Ulj>ian» apparently from earlier sources, in the Tnia
Century A. D. and has been frequently reiterated in later writings* i -.;-
eluding the Digest o* Justinian and the Code Napoleon." Contract!
*&Jcaaia£S t State Contracts in International lav.-. 37 BEIT. V.
&»INT*£m L. 156* 16S-6&(W1).
S. 8IKS&K , s;i-
:
'.ra note 9, at 21} McNair, The General
rsles o£ Law Recognised by Civiliaea Nations, 33 BRIT* Y. ». INT*X* L.




I n—Tin i i—r—~ —rr—
r
I* IV (1</S7).
l%. S1KSKK, supra note 9. at 26.
to7
H. CATTAW, supra note 10.

uprovisions can override legal rules of the contracting state, and, for
this reason contracts have been likened to a constitution for the parties,
21
creating for them a somewhat autonomous legal r*gim«. However, It
has been argued with convincing logic that a contract can not exist ii
ic^al vacuum. Zta enforceability as a contract depends on some legal
system, probably that o( the contracting state, which adopts the ruloa
22
stated or incorporated into the contract.
General principles of law recognised by civiliaed nations, ;*.$.-
sumia^ the insufficiency of local national law, has been suggested as the
23
proper body o£ law for concession contracts. There is consider
precedent for the use of such general principles in deciding concc.
disputes. An example is found in this statement of the Arbitration ...
nal in the Saudi ~ Arabia-Aramco Arbitration:
. . • .insofar as doubts may remain on the content or the mi of
the agreements of the Parties, it i© necessary to resort to the j m»
eral principles of law in order to interpret, and even to supplement,
the respective rights and obligations of the -Parties.*^
^ * Ray, Tho Development and Maintenance of an Oil ^a^^o^n
the Middle East, in .LEGAL. PROBLEMS IN INTE&NATIONAI, 1
INVESTMENT Us, 1415 (C. Shaw ed. 1962); Carlston, cu?ra note 3. at 6: .
*^M*tttt, Tho Prober I^aw of Contracts Concluded by Intr-
. 35 BRIT. Y. B. INT'LL. 34, 49 (1959); McNair, supra 17,
a 7.
MeNair, supra note 1?.
~*~uotcd in H. CATTAN, supra note 10, at 65-66.

.J.
that arbitration the general principle* were considered applical
by implication. Sometimes the agreement, actually provide Tor t. .
uae of general principles. Article 46 of the Iranian Consortium Agre »•
• ent of 1954 roads. In part, as follow -.
.... [the Agreement] shall be governed by and interpreted ax
applied in accordance, with principles of law common to In. .
the several nations in which ih® other parties to tl
are incorporated, and in the absence of such common principl
then by and in accordance with principles of law reco
civilised nations in general, including such of th< inciple:
as may have been applied by international tribunals.25
Dr. Mann feels, on the other hand, that general principles are not a
valid choice of a body of law to apply to concessions because they do
not constitute a system of law. Ke feels they are a source of inte:
tional law and could apply to a concession only in so far as Int
law applies to it.
Principles of law common Zo the contracting parties may
enter into the construction of a concession by being expressly incorpo-
rated into the agreement. The above c;uoted article from the Iranian Co-
sortium Agreement contains such an incorporating provision.
Another theory of the proper law for concession contract , which
does not fit neatly into the categories discussed above, was pres. by
£ -HLS ' 3IKSEK, supra note 9. at 32.
2,'.
*vlaaa t supra note 22, at 45.

13
Frank Hendryx, a Legal Advisor to the Directorate General ©£' P« .- ro-
leum and Mineral Affaire in Saudi Arabia, in a paper before the First
Arab Petroleum Con^ro^s, Cairo, 1959. Pointing out that the ii
acies of local law often make it clear that tee parties could not
intended ite application, ho concluded that iBiar.iaviwaaii law nva. -
.over, he felt the absence of ineernatio; -
.
.*< dents dealing
CO.. Lone made it impossible to icicuiify trua ia*araa*;ea, .
respect to them. Thie led biro to identify international law, in the c
cession context, with the national law o£ the \— . sd :—tos« Engl nd
27
France*
»ion Under Foreign National I
Without going into the occasion;? ~;-.d c::L , of their a
it is important to consider whcU.v-- iaa municipal Ic&al syst
overseao oil producing countries support the binding character
tract made by a state with a private party. Detailed treat of i lav/
of each country would be cumbersome and unnecessary. Hap >ily for
purposes of ciacusaion, the Ic^al aystecrts of most of the major c
sion-granting countries fall into either the Islamic or Civil Lav.- catego*
ries. Generalisations can be drawn from the law of a country * .
27
?^: P??'--^X HAY 55-6E * s * SIKSEK, supra note 9. at 2 :,- ,
49-S4, which discuss and quote the Hendryx paper*

• 14-
ier category which v. ; ._ Ao other member© with fair ac-
curacy. Some of the .-aliaatiena about Islamic and Civil Law will
be touched on later in connection with the general principles of la
fining contractual obligation.
Theoretically* the basic law of any Moslem or hloslem state
is the '. -£'5 , the Sacred Law of Islam, distilled from the Koran
gutina(Practice of the Prophet). However, it is by no means ace
to aseume that the ideal of th» Sbari*a is predictive of the practice of
odern Xoslem states in their treatment of concession contracts.
boss contracts are a species of agreement which tha Shari'a pre-
Jv-u.^ by hundred© of years. On the other hand, Shari'a should no'.
. .-.OiVi;!, oven in assessing the lav/ of states which have adopted c<
based on modern European models. In the states of the Arabian -
sula Islamic law still reigns virtually supreme, and in all Moslcn el
jurists have shown an increasing tendency to invoke Islamic orincJ
Therefore, a study of those principles can provide a key to undez
the specific legal rules Moslem countries may seek to apply to c: : .•-
sions.
2{>Anderson u Coulson, The Mostora Ruler and Co-'r
_^-
tons. 33 N. Y. U. L. REV. W. y20 (1953); 3chacht, Islamic : _




7i;cre is do ro>am ior doubt that the Shay1'
a
recognizee the
existence of contracts and enjoins Moslems strictly to observe the
contractual undertakings? Tito sources of the £ 1 '.-i'a provide aumcr-
..plos of statements supporting this proposition. Gonten
Moelea-.s La'aitually quote tho l-'oran as ^.w.-.; "CI. you who bcL^Y^.
50
o~.. ir coveaaate.' r Or, similarly* "Observe the covenant.
Verily, of the covonant enquiry shall be mawo."*' Doth of these
..- ;.-vo been Interpreted to apply £ozicraL' .
ii'-w- i.;* addition to covenants with God* I - -me vein, !
m n iiwiiim m
•aya/'Moslems arc bound by their stipulation***' While it is
-wcessarily impossible for the letter of the T' »t*a to apply to con-
cession contracts, its applicability in spirit - nistakable*
It is &iso undoubtedly true that Islamic law binds the ruler
to his contracts as much as any other Moslem, and possibly more so*
Islamic law has an individualist structure which does not make a e-
distinction between the official and personal capacities of a ruler. 3
29j. SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 144
(1964).
Anderson Si Couisoa, supra note 23, at 923, q- '•:'•••; 'urn,
V, 1.




Id. at 925, quoting Bukharf, Sahf i III, 187.

-16-
like any Moslem, he has the duty of respecting the rights of the o.; r
party to a contract he makes. As a ruler, he has the additional duty
of upholding the law and is therefore obligated to safeguard contrac-
^-
'if tits which the law gives the other party. Claims o* sovere
prerogative can not, in theory, support the Moslem ruler who fails to
fulfill his contractual promises. The Shari'a is considered the tr<
ecendent law of Cod, to which the ruler is subject. He only executes
35
the law, he does not make it.
The general proposition that binding contracts may be formed
in civil law countries is virtually a truism. V. bother these states may
binv. themselves to concession contract- irrevocably, and the circum-
stances under which they may seek to avoid their contractual con
ments will be fully discussed in connection with the concession's
tion under international law. At this point it is important to point out
only that, unlike the Moslem ruler, who has the right to grant conces-
sions as custodian of the state's minerals, the usual South Americ.
sovereign requires domestic legal authority to do so. Many of tho
states, including Venezuela, recognise by constitutional or legislative
provision state ownership of minerals and provide for the right of th J
Schacht, supra note 2$, at' 144.









" •' t \
.- v of the Contract
la the literature dealing with contra , tales a i
foreign nationals It is stated and restated that the contract la tfc i
ties. Sometimes the law of the contract is put forward ..
at the parties. Those frequent sta s make ace
-rate treatment of the law of the contract or I r. cor acf-
hi as will bo seen, there is much doubt as to Its separate
rty in his career as General Counsel of the Arabian /
no Oil Company, George V . i^ay, Jr. was told by the King of Ar
t compliance with the law of his country required only refercn
any's contract with the state for guidance, "since that c,
was th* law of the parties."1 Professor Hegaai of Cairo Univc
mded on the rule and itu effects;
The meaning of the rule that the contract fa the Shari'ah of
the contracting parties is that an obligation resulting from
contract is equal in its binding effect to &v obligation resul
from the law. Inasmuch as an individual cannot liberate hi
from an obligation imposed by law, likewise, it is no': permissi-
ble for a contracting party to liberate himself from an obii,
resulting from a contract to which he i« a party.




rule is base U found*
cal, ethical and economic. First, it ic batted on. the
\
norny of the wilL A person doc, ..
unless he desires so to be. IX he Is rtake an c'.
a* . thing prevents him from doir,. \o second
: .„ it is based on tho principle of respect for pacts and cov





ty for stability in transactions. If ... id not
....-_ parties, then people would stop ent<
..-., unc . ity arises, confidence
.-j and legal situations - scome pc , . .-
ly. the contract must have bin* I . force in a .. as
to bar either of the contracting parties from cancel - or
It unilaterally . . .
Since the contract is the law of the contract!] . irUe; , I
cannot be cancelled or altered unless bo part - .
.: or there are legal cause- provided for in tho law for si
cancellations or alteration.^
The abovo represent© the Islamic viewpoint* but it ac
ly reflects the position of a much wider variety c . . al system: .
Code Napoleon of 1-30*2, which is ancestral to many of the newer civil
codec says at Article 1134:
Aj lents legally formed have the fore© of law over th
ho arc the makers of them.
They cannot be revoked e>;ce?t with their mutual consent,
for causes which the lav.' authorizes.
They must be executed with good faith. **
The view expressed by Professor Hegaai and the view c.
by the Code Napoleon are both consistent with the propositi
*3 2 HEGA2I, GENERAL THEORY OF OBLIGATIONS IN I
TIAN LAW 135-eG (1954), quoted in RAY 27-2:3.
^CODZ NAPOLEON 310 (trans!., R. G. Claltor publ. i960).

19
that a contract ra ay make legal rules for the parties. Hegazi s 1 e
to lean toward the position that the contract cr a separate legal
-,.-*-. v., inasmuch as he states It is ^^bjeev vw change only If authority
can be found in the contract itself. On the other hand, the quoted a2 ti-
cle from the Code Napoleon allows revocation "for causes which t
law authorizes." This seems more in line with the view that the
of the contract derives its validity from being incorporated into s<
other legal system. It has been argued both ways. Professor Vej
characterises concession contracts as "quasi* international agre its."
such, he feels, they create an independent legal order, compk
s&gt&lating the relationship of the parties, except in so far as i in
the eoatractual scheme may bo filled by rules of local law incorpora-
ted into the legal regime of the contract. Lord McNair grants that
a contract may abdicate a system of law within which it is intended
to operate, but he emphasizes that agreements intended to have -
effect must be based on an existing system of law.
Picking a proper side to the controversy is not important for
present purposes. Either view would allow the parties to specify legal
40K. CATTAN, supra note 10, at 35, citing A. VON VERI
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSJLANDISCHES OFFENTIUCES RECHT UNX>
VOLKERRECHT 653(1958).
* McNair, supra note 17, at 7.

20
rules which can have a binding effect on their relationship, whether
oration into local law. C .
.
mo cont
almost a* / vhe law or principles to V
not coverei
.
by ^ specified body of law would usually be covered !
local law, under either theory. They differ only in the avcaue by
which come non*contractual body of law becomes applicable to aucl -
42questions.
The actual content of the lex contract^-: must usually I
rived at by following a re-wro...eo in the contract. As was menti
previously, concession contracts will ordinarily <ify bodies of !
for the agreement, such as public international law, or principles
law recognized* by civilised nations* Thus it is Imp i le to c,
-•—a discussion of the likely results for concession conti
should ^ leg contract-ni l theory be followed. The practical effect c i
j • itract - a theory can be seen by bearing in mind that it is an c\
present, possibly applicable body of law which gets its norms by i
ii»2 rules contained in other bodies of law, to be discussed hereafter.
C>: :':-:•p.c'c liidcu) o£ International Law
The applicability of public international lav/ to concess
.
tracts has already been discussed. Assuming its applicability dir<
or - express choice of the parties, the specific rules of int..
*2H. CATTAN, supra note 10, at 3&.

21
tional contract law will now be considered. The two great rule is per-
meatli g the literature o-" Btate responsibility for contractual under-
Ings are Pacta sunt servanda and its corollary, the doctrine of
acquired righto.
-eta sunt servanda
, the principle that contractual promi-
ses are to be observed, is a truism whichwould seem to be a sine
qua non
[
of any legal order. It is a well established rule of intern
tional law. But it has had a somewhat checkered history, and it is not
yet completely out of danger.
The principle has been traced back to the peoples of the
ancient East. These people felt the deity accorded protection to con-
tractual promises, and divine participation in the enforcement of co i-
tracts continued through the time of the Romans. Islamic law still
makes fidelity to promises a religious requirement and, in a less ob-
vious way, the same requirement can be discerned in the Christian
view of contracts.^'"' The period of the Renaissance brought different
theories elucidating the concept of sovereignty, some of which lent
themselves well to arguments opposing the sanctity of state contrad .
One such theory was the "Reason of State' ' put forward by
Machiavelli to excuse sovereign acts contrary to law and justice when




:h ^vta wwc deemed necessary to the interests of the state.
-hiavelli's views had but a small effect on the thi ,,, of his c
era, ihey domain high in the esteem of the advocates of power politic .
Jean Doriin expressed what has become a famous theory or
faOvorc;.;;aty in Pe ia -\ - r.V,clique (1577). He said that the soverei
supreme and independent of state laws, that no law was immune to change
under the pressure of aecessity, and that no act connected with j1-
fare of the state could be discreditable. This would seem to support the
view that the international obligations of a state continue only as . as
it is in the interest of the state to abide by them. However* V i
points out that the social context of Bodin's writings o such
interpretation of his views unwarranted. Actually, ~ ~ ...
to defend the authority of the French political state against the ..
threatening Church, Holy Roman Empire, and feudal lords. Bod in also
stated, "fidelity and loyalty are the very bases of all justice. Not
the State, but the whole human community is held together by them,"
Nevertheless, Bodin's writings marked the beginning of a contr -y
on the obligatory nature of state contracts which has continued to I
present day. On one side of the controversy wzitcrs of a more —
tist bent, like Spinoza, and Kegel, have argued that no law can fetter the
44**RAY 39; V ehberg, supra note 4 3, at 776.

; oi a sovereign state. On the other side, r* like Triepol
and Ansllc I supreme over sca jnwill,
:©ntracta bii . Ing on. all v.-ho enter in* i, inclutiii
.'
.thoritiea usually tak..
Although absolutist sentiments have b
rn tiiv... , very recent resur
evil for the sanctity of International contract to continu* L-
-'a sun-, i —.-•."
J
-.. As mi ••-
sessions of absolute state power come cialist '- or
The Russian position has been that no law or princij U _
ht to be paid for natioi
sov* r« I; o need not keep its word to a foreign citizen svci
,
position does not scorn to apply to Soviet property. 1 be laws 1a-
lizing foreign property in Bulgaria between 1946 and *v>* eaccop
Soviet property in every case.
47
It is impossible to stretch any
tinition of Mlawn to include the principle that any property may ri
ly be taken, "except mine." Still, most emei . . nations have a
'-
, ehberg, ^c^ra note 43, at 777-32.
>^";e".-pr^ty H. FLEMING. STATES, CONTRACTS,
{13601: SAY: Carlston. Concession
ation. 52 AM. J. INT*!, L. 260 (1958); Mann, auora note 14;
47K. FLEMING, supra note 46, at 63-65.

fciooal U J of colonialism and socialict "legal1 " pronouncements. ae«
comp aa they often are by anti-imperialist slogans, could not
11 to roach a few sympathetic oars. Other thwori .-id. under*
mine I .actity of International contracts come from V* estern s
ara ..ose opinions are entitled to consideration from a legal stand*
point, as opposed to a purely political one* Some of these appear to
ifuse the international law applicable to state contractual oblig;
wit] Licable to expropriation o» alien property.
.
, bocomo well settled that international law doea no1
hibit sovereign expropriation of alien property* Further, the lacl .~
pro) Levated expropriation to the status a_ a right.
by a sovereign of foreign property pursuant to v..-. right can
never be an intcrnation.il wrong in itself, provided the taking is not
discriminatory or arbitrary and is followed by compensation. '" . 3
rnational responsibility of the state is engaged by a discriminatory
or a i'ailure to compensate on the theory that it has comt
an international delict with respect to a foreign national. However, ti
™*Id. at 56; Delson, NationaliKa tiort c-T 4. \ e 5» fl '' Canal Com
pany :
t
loiiG~,~ cJ \*olAic and Private lntcrc,*ri:lrr::al .Lav/ , i>7 C~-_~ •-. I*
REV. 755. 762 (19&?)«
T <n ° 5*;*fo s °^. ^Qrtrtanent Povoyeirnty Qvo.-c Natural V- >: !
mrces 92-96. U. N, Doc. A/AC. 97/5/ Rev. 2 (1962),
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... i ... expropriatory act itself is not open to question.50 Under
.-; view that as alien company** s ., fcits uj ier a cone
...4 contract are equivalent to property rights unprotected by cc . c£,
they become similarly subject to the right o£ ..on. U/". .-al
ion of a concession contract by a state would then never *
. r .-' * — I responsibility for violation of I
self. At most it could result in a right to rej i ion frot ... in
eases e* discriminatory or uncompensated abrogation. • -
»
.eh reaches nearly the same result by a different route, si
contractual rights are not within the scope of the law
,>riaUon* but that neither are they protected by pact ^
Thus* one who loses rights he held under ~ state contract may - ..
h*Ap. A-cm international law only where the state has violated l\ l@
..nsit denial oi; justice.^*
As was pointed out previously, the opponents of th
lake the position that concession contracts are inherently inter.
-I in character and are analogous* therefore, to treaties* Ju^t ag
.he ceso with thrcatiee* they argue* breach o£ a concession contract
generally S. FRIEDMAN* EXPROPRIATION I! -
NATIONAL LAV (1953).
SI Ic. at 157.
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should result per se in interrational responsibility under the prin-
52
ciple Pacta sunt servanda. Moreover, drawing a strict analogy
between contractual rights and property rights ignores the fact thi t
b-y the very act of signing a concession contract the state suspends
its right to "expropriate" for the duration of the contract.^ "*
Garcfa Amador adopts a very soundly reasoned view some-
where betweon the extremes of the opinions discussed above. In order
to consider whether Pacta sunt servanda as a rule of Internationa
law applies directly to state contracts with foreign nationals, he ;cs
those contracts into two categories : those which contain no provii
express or implied that they shall he governed by legal principles
International character, and those which do contain such provisio
or an arbitration clause contemplating international types of settlement.
Contracts in the first category he would treat as governed by municipal
law only. For them, he continues the analogy to property subject to
propriation, with the result that states would become Internationa]
liable only for "arbitrary" breaches. '-acta s-av/c ljv rva-i-^a woul;. ap-
ply directly to contracts in the second category in so far as tha stipu-
lated body of law-- international law, general principles, principle
3 P. JESSUP, sujrra note 13; Ray, supr x note 21; Carl- - -.
supra note 3.
53K. FLEMING, supr ~ note 46, at 57,
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mon to the parties— contained the yule.
The u doctrine of acquired rights" is the other x*ule of pub-
He international law commonly invoked by those who seek to uphc
the sanctity ox state contracts against claims of sover i to
54
modify them unilaterally. The doctrine operates as a limitation
on state action which destroys or modifies rights previously acquire
by aliens. The doctrine is related to Jt'acia ?..-,-.; .-;-• v. :.•..'.
a
and m;
even be considered to include that principle, if contractual rights ;
treated as being different from property rights only in their mode
acquisition. This is the position taken by Garcia Amador. He rec -
nizes tho existence of the doctrine of acquired rights in intemati<
law and would allow it directly to protect any "public contract" which
had been "internationalised" through choice of the parties. Thus,
breach of any such contract would result in an immediate interna.
55
wrong by the state.
V. bother or not Pacta sunt servanda and the doctrine of acquil
rights can logically be considered separately, they do often receive
•^The Status of Permanent Sovereignty oyer Natural V
and Acsources ao, U. N. Doc. A/AC. 97/5/ fiev. 2 (1962).
"^Amador, (Fourth) Report on International Rer.ooi^iMI
[195V] 2 Y. B. INT'L D. CORfM'N 1, 3, 24. U. N. Doc. A/CN.4/119
(1959).

separate treatment and the factor which identifies an "acquired ri
controversy is time. Municipal law ~cia the requirements for the
acquisition of a right. Once those requirements are met, the right
is acquired and can not bo taken away by changes in the municipal
law which occur later in time.56 This rule definitely gives the pro-
tection of international law to rights in tangible property. Whether it
gives similar protection to rights under concession contracts is still
57debated. However, opinion seems to preponderate in favor of such
protection. Those who oppose the doctrine of acquired rights, c
as it applies to concession contracts or on broader grounds, support
their objections on arguments of sovereign prerogative. Those argu-
ments wore considered previously in connection with the law of ex-
propriation and Pacta sunt servanda.
The state party to an oil concession is often a newcomer to the
world of modern economics. As time passes such states tend to become
more knowledgeable about the oil operations taking place within their
56S. SIKSEK, supra note 9, at 63.
^•Amador, supra note 55, at 9.
53E. NW'OGUGU, THE LEGAL, PROBLEMS OF FOREIG
INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 178 (1965); S. SIKSEK,
suora note 9, at 76.
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borders than they were when the concession we led. Upon learn-
ing that Ihw operating cot»pany*a profits have g: exceeded wh
they originally thought pou«iolc, these otetc y be tempted toai
lee requires changing the contract to accor i ecenorr
fact* which their earlier immaturity caused them to overlook. To
support such an argument, the international law doctrine r '
59has been invoked. Like Pad » it ia -i doc-
«tMiWiM..«i|i|.Miii«MMM WiM—> * I**—.—!«—» l ull II > > I Wi iww »»»' «**.,«
trine which grew out of the law of trv-^'des» Because of t! i-
>etween state contracts and treaties, there t ould be no objo
to applying rebus sic stantibus to such contracts* However, the
taning of the doctrine is usually distorted when it is utilized to >ti-
£y unilateral state modification of a concession contract.
Broadly speaking, rebus sic zl stiLuo is a recognition of & i
practical fact that the parties, despite what they say in a treaty, <
fix for all time the conditions upon which their agreement is has .
It gives *- party the right to demand release from an obligation \. I
there Is a vital change in the circumstances under which the
\ as originally concluded. Beyond this broad st i the doctri:
ill defined* Moreover, since it is the business o£ law to enforce, .
destroy contracts, i icata / a s is necessarily subject to i..
ant limitations. The limitations are similar to those placed up--
S^G. LENCZOV SKI, supra note 0, at
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analogous municipal law doctrines ©£ frustration of purpose or in
aibiiity of performance as applied to private contracts.**^
It Is certain that
__
at ussj
„,,.,„',„,„,/„ . - -<ot a principle %t
aw* relief from an obligation which new condi . i
pcetocly burdensome or even unfair* V- hat it contemplates is cl
ln a condition so fundamental to the agreerne ..
&vc based their understanding on the unc
ance of that condition* The changed circumstance must be such
hue', the parties foreseen it, they themselves would presu
61






'-v-'^ ia applicable and the change in circ^— tance i- vlt . ,
not allow unilateral abrogation o* the agreement. sr, it jui
demand to the other party for termination or the in.it! .
Uonai judicial proceedings. Unilateral abrogation t< :are
lubmit to International adjudication can bo prima facie evld<—
J . i Ic tai tih is is being invoked aa a cloak for v.'hat is in f^Cv a
breach of internafioaai law.
&°L. O: 'FENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAV,' 941 (8th ed. I .
Lauterpacht 1955).
61
J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 336 (6th ed. '•'. . al-
dock 1963); J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL L
374 (196?).
62 L. OPPEKHEIM, supra note 60, at 941-42; S. SIKSEK,
note v. at $1-92; J. STARKE, supra note 61, at 37 « -7S.

y*
General Principle e of 3Law
Along with other sources of law. Article 38 of tho Statute
the International Court of Justice calls for reference to
nth«
principles of law recognized by civilized nations." Thus the "general
principles" were expressly identified as a body of law and becar
important source of international law. These principles can ei
>ute over a concession either by being specified in the contj
an applicable body of law, or by providing international law
to be applied to the concession. Despite the huge importance c
neral principles of law. there has been as yet no precise deli.
of the actual content of that body of law.
6
"* Its content can be dis
only in broad terms. Some of the principles have already been
bed in the foregoing discussion of other bodies of law and will, there-
fore, simply be catalogued here.
The general principles are usually, although not necessarily,
distillations of characteristics found to be common to most develop
municipal legal systems. However, it is important to keep in
the general principles of law do not incorporate specific rules
from
municipal ie^al system; rather, common legal policies are sough .
'
&3H. CATTAN, supra note 10, at 60; Schlesinger,
on the General Principles of Law Recornieed by Civilised
:.:>;.
^jl.
51 Ahv. J. IttT'L L» 7 34 (1957).
•.
64 J. BRIERLY, supra note 61, at 63.
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Ray includes within the general principles of law*
«. ., i i n ...
serv • nda and "The contract is the law of the ;>. . >a ^5 C
mador te >— j eta sunt aer . should no
contract conto;u ijecusc states have an in] ''affect 1 '
property, irrespective of the owner's nationality, which includes t
right to terminate contractual rights* Later writes not se
to fa [uarreled with Ray's Inclusion of "The contract is the ".
the le*»"
Respect for acquired rights has bees one of
tarsi principles of law recognised by civilised :
just enrichment. 91 The latter is contained la e
or another. It requires restoration by one v
propriates or receives property intere-i* o." ._...., ter, I
,o been recognized as a general principle, stemming from a uni-
versal legal requirement of good faith. The support it could lend to
the sanctity of international contracts is obvious.
^RAY 47. fee also E. NVOGUCU, ;,r ;va r-ctc 58, at IS* .
°9Amador, tre;^ra note 55, at 31.
67 E. . I OGUGU, supra note 55, 177-8 2; S. SIKSEK, su^ note
'}. at 28j McNair, supra note 17, at 16*18,
&SK. : CM, LAV, AND ORGANIZATION IN \K ...
SOCIETY 292 <lv62).

The Saudi Arabia-Aramco Arbitration
i mmmmmmm^m, i i iw^m^mw »i " "iimm ii >ii w«—WWWMIM»u-UIIiiiii
The 1958 arbitratioa of a concession dispute hotww.
Arabia and the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) provh
aa excellent illustration 01 the operation o£ a fairly typical conces-
sion a reement and ot the interplay c£ the various systems of law
scussed above.'"
The concession there involved dated
Aramco:
. . .the exclusive right, for a period of sixty years ft
fective date hereof, to explore, prospect, drill for, extr«
treat, manufacture, transport, deal with, carry away and v.-
petroleum ,••»'*
After a lengthy search, oil was discovered and ftrst exported in 19
t.
Aramco never established marketing facilities outside Ara'
it sold its entire production to its parent co. a: Leo,
pursuant to '
take agreements." These companies in turn sold the production to
other buyers. The typical transaction involved delivery by
Aramco,
from Arabian ports or pipeUne; terminals, into tankers chai
the parent companies or other buyers nominated by them. Aram
and its parent companies did not own tankers themselves. Aran
™Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),
27




sales were principally effected by means of f.o.b. contract*, wher
title to the oil and risk ol lose transferred to the buyer at the ptrma-
««at hose e~- ...Cvlcw o- -oard the tankere.
la ly54, the Arabian Government c .1 into an agree.
with Mr. A. S, Onassis calling for the establishment by Mm of Sa .
Aral Maritime Taafcere Company Ltd. (Satco). Setco was giv.
w Ulrty-year right ol priority to transport Saudi Arabian oil to f< ......
»
porta. Only tanker© owned by Aramco and its ,
the time of the agreement were excepted from the priority giv«
Since those companies did not own tankers* implementation I
Cnas.it agreement would have destroyed the marketing
structure
Aramco had built up. The Minister of Finale* wrote a latter
to A ram-
co, informia- it ol the Oaassia agreement and directing
it to implement
its provisions. Aramco rofueod.
After a failure to settle the dispute by negotiation, the pa
drew up an arbitration a£reement, calling lor the
appointment of one
arbitrator by each party. The Arbitration Tribunal, consist
arbitrators and a referee chosen by them was directed to
sit in S *itaer«
land, Ar— le.IV ol the ArbitraUon Agreement provided:
The Arbitration Tribunal shall decide this dispute
-
r
a> iu accordance with the Saudi Arabian law, . . .
in ^
as matters within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia are
cone.

(b) in accordance with the law deemed by the arbitration
ial to be applicable in 30 far as rr.r tiers beyond the juris-
diction o£ Saudi Arabia are concerned.^
Aramco contended that the exclusive grant given it by the
C©r.- ..... : w;v».;;.u: included the ri~hi w ^U:'^L; -.« hew oil should
bo transported by sea and that the Onassis agreement Infringed its
sr the concession agreement. The Arabian Gov»r.
contended that sea transportation was not included in the exclusive
grant and that, even if it were included, Aramco had not eseex ... -d
i.~ _ . . ,a ii'wiw^;'i w*. by van.
r
Ji ke tribunal Carnes. first to thu c,uasiioa of the pra^wr Lady c.
law to use in construing the concession. In order to decide that que -
tion, it was necessary to identify the legal nature of the concession,
so that the choice of law rules of private international law could be
applied to it* The tribunal recognised that different systems of la
viow concessions variously as public or private contracts, as creal
vested ownerships, or profit a prendre. Islamic law, which the tri ;
felt was the proper law to characterise the concession, views cone
sions unequivocally as contractual, and it does not cis Anguish beti
public and private contracts. A variety of choice a*' law niceries c
be applied to contracts under private international law; the law of - c
72Id. at 231.

rum, the law of the place of per.chance, tho law of the place of
contracting, *..-,<! so on. The tribunal felt the Aramco concession
was a contract which waa necessarily subject to di*fcrwfc bodies of
law, becauao of ite inherently international character. Tho law of
Saudi Arabia was felt to bo definitely applicable because of the e*>
... choice cf the 7>v-rtlv;s In the arbitration agreement. However,
. never been oil production in Arabia at the tli
•ion \/i« si^n^d. Oil u-i ,_.-- Juris^rud«*c« w>— absent from Its I . u
For that reason, the tribunal said:
The concession agreement is thus the fundamental law of Che
Parties, and the Arbitration Tribunal is bound to rec
particular importance owing to tho fact that it fills a gap in the
lcjjal system of Saudi Arabia with regard to the oil industry*
The Tribunal holds that the Concession has the nature of a
constitution which has the effect of conferring acquired rig!
on the contracting Parties. . .
In 30 far as doubts may remain ea the c nt or on tho mc.
ing of the agreements of the Parties, it is necessary to res
to the general principles of law and to apply them in ordor to
interpret, and oven to supplement, the respective rights and
obligations of iho Parties.7
3
The tribunal went on to say that it would ascertain the applicable
oral principles by looking first to customs and practices of the world
oil industry, and second to world case-law and pure jurisprudence.
It pointed out that particular importance must be attached in this v
ncction to customs and practices of United States oil producers, ii





As to matters which wera inherently c .. .e the jurisdic-
tion of the municipal law oi any state, such as transport by sea ax
Le rosponsieiiAy ior violation ei ;;.; tonal obligations! public
i.uw:.-..c:.::.i lew was 14elc ;,o be ^?p~ cable, *^
T.iw tribu'aa. i'clk »hw voreiag oi w»\j Cv..uw, u.c. contract and
its obvious purpose to grant the right to produce oil in A:.
sell it abroad fully refuted the Government's contention that ti. i
elusive grant did not include the right to desi.^ e modes of transpor-
tation to Ararnco's buyers. Moreover, it felt the conduct of the p
v-w^_.-.
w:.
w.e years proceevli;;^ the Gaassis agreement amply shower u'u.t
f.o.b. sales were a proper exercise oi that right.**
Oi more importance for our purpose was ih~ treatment
given the Arabian contention that the Onassis agreement was ma
pursuant to the right of the state to regulate its maritime commerce.
The .ribaaai acknowledged that the ri^ht to coairol transportation of
anything to and from its territory is an indisputable attribute o£ na-
tional sovereignty* However* it pointed out that the right is not wi1 -
out limitation, saying:
In the c::crcise of its sovereignty, the State of Saudi Arabia hi
imposed restrictions upon itself in order to grant to the conce i-





stipulated in the 1933 Concession Agreement, an exclusive
oi' -Ion by land and sea for a limited period of time.
has guaranteed to the Company that it would not exercise ti
sovereignty in any way contrary to the obligations it has at
taken towards Aramco and to the rights it has granted. The sev-
er
.
of the State is not limited by son tor cause; it is
the state itself which undertakes the ( ive) csllgation not
impede the grantee's exercise of its i . \ 3 :iple of
respect for acquired rights prevents the St from derogati
from this undertaking. By signing the 1933 Concession Agree*
ment» do Government has already exercised its rights to i
te the ingress and egress of ships into end from its . ,~
rial waters* The exclusive right of Aramco can r..
modified \/ithout the Company's consent.*"
Thus, the tribunal concluded that the Onassis agre^.v.
v;«- i~e*Jsctive as against Aramco's acquired right, even though a
claim of sovereign prerogative had been advanced in aid of that
agreement.
LAW OF THE FEDERAL OIL AND CAS LEASE
Nature of the Lease Relationshio
Before turning to a discussion of the legal nature and efl
76Id. at 212-13.

of oil and gas le lasucd by the United States Government or* pn
lie
,
reference must be made briefly to the common law of t
-ry lease relationship between a private ;-*iaeral owner a. ..
oil
- developer. Federal loaves &re a of course, created pu-.*su-
ant to statutory authority, but the resultant relationship between the
Government and the lessee must still be defi. rgely in common*
law terms. It is not necessary to the purposes of this paper t
the discussion of tho common-law relationship he too detailed. C
ultimate objective is to compare the American ail an. lease to
the foreign concession in order to determine what effect dome-
.1 treatment of it might have on broad principles of ir.ternatio; .
law. However important the niceties of Anglo-AmorJ -
may be to domestic practice, they are not particularly important .
international law, which must distill its rules from the basic features
of many diverse legal systems.
Under the domestic legal system of the United States the
owner of land is also the owner, in some way, of minerals under!)
!
it. Since oil and gas can migrate horizontally, unlike the hard miner-
als, there has been some conflict as to whether the landowner si
be thought of as owning the oil and gas actually beneath his land at any
given time or whether, on the other hand, ho owns only a right to take
the oil and gas from under his land. Depending G'o. the view follow

„4Q»
~wner ma) have ~ owrporeal or incorporeal interest; but ho
a ~ real property interact in either v. ... v
j "^c transferred with or apart from tho l< ji2 in a variety-
ways. Here wo are concerned -with t.-aasfere effected by means c-r
oil and gas lease.
In the v;;.lc«i oi- and ^os Ivooo, the mineral owner grants
the right to enter his land and o^ioro -or oil and gas. This ri
continues for a specified period of time, the ,ry t t?m of tl
_ . *so, curing which the lessee must drill for oil or pay delay r »nt«
- oil or £00 be discovered, too rights of th .
as long after the end of the primary term as there is profitable pro-
duction! The mineral owner reserves to himself a share, usually
one-eighth, of the land's production, and the locsoo becomes th© owner
of the re.no.ndcr. Although not without some logical Inconsistencies
,
the interest received by tho lessee is usually classified as a d< In-
able fee in oil and gas. It is a fee because in legal theory, if not ...
,
.-
cal fact, profitable production, and hence the interest, could con'.I..
for ever. It is determinable because tho requirements for too so.
nuance of the interest, such as payment of delay rents or the exist
of production, are worded as special limitations on the grant. Fail .re
to comply with any limitation results in automatic termination of
lessee's interest and reversion of the fee to the mineral owner. Cov-
enants, express or implied, are also included in the oil and gas lease.
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.each of them ordinarily results la contractual liability and not ter-
mination of the grant, in the first instance. The important point for
ua ait a vested, real property interest is generally held to bo con-
ed to the lessee at the execution of an oil ano gas lease. This.
true c - a wide divergence of opinion on the specific attributes of
the property interest mvolvec.
Oil leases on United States public land- arc ca.
noral Leasing Act of 1920, together with its subsequent amendra
This act represented a departure from the earlier pattern for cH
tion of Government owned land, which, generally speaking, consisted
of complete alienation of the surface and minerals under laws HI
Homestead Act of 1S62.79 Congress reserved public mineral Ian
from sale in 1866 and then, in 1870, prescribed the method for their
disposal in the Placer Mining Act. Oil and gas were not specifics
mentioned in the Placer Mining Act but such lands were included by aa-
77Scc genera: ly_ 1A W . SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL i
CAS !| 151-154 (perm. ed. 1954); 1 H. WILLIAMS b C. MEY ! .
OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 201-212 (1962); Walker. The Mature ofJ.
Property Interests Croated by an Oil and Gas Lease in T :--~.'o , 7 T.~ XAS
L. REV. 1 (1923).
73 30U.S.C. §S 131-263(1964).
793ennett, Public Land Policy. Reconciliation of Fv-
and Private Development, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEV
ANNUAL ROCKY MT. MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 311. 314-15(1966),
citing 43 U.S. C. §! 161-302(1964).
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tnption in the lands subject to placer location. When a location was
perfected, title to the minerals passed to the locator absolutely.
was not until the Mineral Leasing Act of l?2 - the Government
-ined a continuing royalty interest in oil and gas lands distribul
rivate parties.80 The original act did not provide for a Icai
the modern sense of the term, but rather for a permit to explore
oil and gas. If the search was successful within the prescribed p
of time, leases would issue calling for payment of varying fractio
royalties to the Government. These leases were not of indefinite dura-
tion but their fixed terms could be extended or renewed under a
conditions. Through a process o£ statutory amendment and ps :
accommodation the federal lease evolved, by the late 1940s, into
something very similar to the typical oil lease between private X
in the United States.8 *
As presently constituted, the Mineral Leasing Act Instructs
the Secretary of the Interior to lease public land known or believ
contain oil or gas for a primary term of years and for so lonj; th
after as production is obtained from the land. Lands within a kno
producing formation must be leased to the highest competitive bide r,
804 W. SUMMERS, supra note 77, § 867.
81Malone. Oi l and G^s Leases en United S^ aGoyj. /!
Lends, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL INSTITU VE ON
OILAND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 309. 313-17. 322-29 (1951).

whereas unproved land is subject to leasing by application, on a non»
competitive basis. Primary terms of five and ten years are speci-
fied Cor competitive and noncompetitive leases respectively. Duri
their primary terms leases arc conditioned on payment of a minimum
delay rental of 50 cents per acre, due annually in advance. A roya
of 12 1/2 percent is reserved to the United States out of any produc»
tion obtained. In the case of competitive leases, 12 1/2 percent la
^a-tad only as the minimum fraction of production which must be
retained as royalty. Subject to estceptiono similar to those found in
private leases, the federal lease terminates for failure of production
&2
in paying quantities after the end of the primary term.
The requirements of federal leases as presently issued \
placed in the Mineral Leasing Act by amendment in 1946.' "* Thus,
the federal lease in modern form was born at a time when the legal
interest created by the typical private lease had baea clearly defii
by state court decisions. Inasmuch as the lease called for by the
Mineral Leasing Act is basically the same as the private lease, it
has seemed apparent that it accomplishes about the same transaction
as the private lease; the conveyance of a determinable fee estate in
82
30 U.S.C.IS 226(a)-(f) (1964).
33Act of August 8, 1946, eh. 916, § 3, 60 Stat. 951.
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in w* aad gas, However, the Supreme Court decision in Udall
'*' '""•^•-•^ has cast some doubt on the validity of this proposition.
The case involved an executive > rawing ecru.
Alaskan public lands from "... settlement, location, sale, or entry,
or other disposition (except for fish trap sites) uncle* any of the pub-
lic-la .'. laws applicable to Alaska, . . .". The Secretary of the I
Inter j r—id the order as not covering oil and gas leasing, t
val Lng lease applications which had b^eu filed during the ei ve
period of the withdrawal order. In upholding the Secretary'- * -
the Court said :
"Settlement," "location, 11 "sale" and "entry" arc all teri
contemplating transfer of title to the lands in question. It was
therefore reasonable for the Secretary to construe "or otl
disposition" to encompass only dispositions which. 111 i
four enumerated, convey or lead to the conveyance of the tj
of the United States •«• for example "grants" ^nd "allotments."
... an oil and gas lease does not vest title to the Ian- .. . the
lessee."
If the Court meant to state without qualification that a lease can not
constitute a grant or conveyance of any sort of property interest
under the Mineral Leasing Act, federal leasehold interests have be ;a
completely removed from the common law defining the interests of
oil and gas lessees generally. Under such a reading of the abc
34 330 U. S. 1 (1965).
85M. at 19.

language, the federal lessee can lock only to federal statutes and
regulations in order to clarify his relationship to the Government
86
lessor. However, it seems wiser to read the Court's language
simply as a reiteration of the Secretary's view together with a state-
ment that his interpretation is reasonable, even if it is not the only
tble interpretation. The Court said earlier in the opinion that
it could, on review, uphold the Secretary's interpretation aa reasc
able even if it were not the interpretation the Court itself would e
had it hcen called upon to decide the question in the first instance.
Zn short, the Court said the Secretary was reasonable but not nee i-
sarily right in classifying federal leases as something other than
conveyances. At the very least, it remains arguable that lessee;;,
under leases from the United States Government, like lessees undex
leases from private owners, hold determinable fee mineral estates
and not mere licenses.
Cancellation of the Federal Lease
The Constitution of the United States vests Congress with
the power to make all necessary rules respecting public lands.
S6sGe Discussion Kote , 22 OIL & GAS REP. 730 (1965).
37 3cJ0 U. S. at 16.
G3
U. S. CONST, art. IV, § 3.

A f
Congress has delegated this power, in a general way, to the Secretary
OS
of the Interior. This general delegation of power has formed the
-- —
-•
-•-- o^cretary'u assertion that he is authorized to cancel is-
sued oil and gas leases, under some circumstances, even in the ab-
sence of specific statutory authority. The assertion has been up
Broadly speaking, cancellations of federal leases, wheth
by judicial action or administrative action by the Secretary of the
Interior, may be placed in two categories. The first category con-
tains those cancellations which are based upon some defect in t
issuance of the lease or fraud by the lessee occurring before issi
The second category contains cancellations arising from lessee non-
compliance with the lease, statutes, or regulations occurring after t
issuance of the lease. The former category is by far the more import-
ant both because the largest number of cancellations fall within it as
8943 U. S. C. § 1457 (Supp. II. 1964).
ee Blair, The Cancellation of Federal Oil end G
'— * 1 1 Ml —MMM»dpl|i 'Wll >l'"lll I W I« IP«——WMM—^M—
I
I I HIMI^M— i » lH» -*»M-
'
»*W^WWW '» J IIWilM
An Adminis trative or JucUcird Function? , 51 CEO. L. J. 2Zi (1963);
Holmberg, Oil ar«ri Gas Leases on Federal Lands: A Time for Ti tle
:urity , in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL ROCKY
MINERAL LAV INSTITUTE 313(1963); Stall, The Authority of *!.-
Secretary of the Interior to Cancel No:i-Co-a .octitivc O il and C
L^ason by Administrative Action, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH
ANNUAL ROCKY. ML MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 1 (1959), for





- 'O those cancellations have given **ae to the greater amount of
controversy. ' Tho authority £02: the cancellations of the latter v.
/ is spoiled out in the Mineral Leasing Act itself. The applicable
portion of Section 27, as amended, reads as follows:
If any interest in any lease is owned, or controlled, directly
or indirectly, by means of stock or otherwise, in violation of
[specified sections], the lease may be cancelled, or tho intern-
so owned may bo forfeited, or the person so owning or control*
the interest may bo compelled to dispose of the interec
in any appropriate proceeding instituted by the Attorney Gen-
ral. Such a proceeding shall be instituted in the United
district court . • .$ 2
Section 27 deals primarily with lessee violations of maximum acre-
. limitations. Applicable portions of the more general Sect!..
as amended, road as follows;
. . . any lease issued under . . . this title may be forfeit
and canceled by an appropriate proceeding in the United Stat
district court . . • whenever the lessee fails to comply with a
of the provisions of [the previously specified] sections, of v
lease, or of the general regulations ... in force at the time of
the lease, • • .
'
Any lease issued after August 21, 1935, . . . shall be subject
to cancellation by the Secretary of the Interior after thirty
notice upon the failure of the lessee to covnoly with any of >
provisions of tho lease, unless or until the land covered by any
such lease is known to contain valuable deposits of oil or gas ...
9*3iair, supra note 90, at 222.
92 30 U. S. C. j 134(h) (1) (1964).
^ 330 U. S. C. § laS(a) (1964).
^30 U. S. C. § 188(b) (1964).

The -bove provisions appear to authorise cancellation, only
for post-lease eventft i and then, save for cases of noncompliance
lease terms before discovery of production, to require resort to judi-
cial process rather than to allow purely administrative cancellatl.
Yet, around 1950, the Secretary of the Interior began to assert the
authority to administratively cancel leases .'oi: pre-lease
Tl .
_ial history of the Secretary's eventual success in that as-
rtion is the subject of the discussion to follow.
This history culminated in the 1963 Supreme Court decisic
95
in the case of Socachc v. Uclall, which perfected, so to speak, the
Secretary of the Interior's right to cancel a federal oil and gas lc .
because of a pre-lease event.
That case involved an application by Boesche for a noncom-
petitive lease on eighty acres of federal land in Oklahoma. The applica-
tion was filed in the appropriate land office on September 11, 1956.
that time one Coaneil had already filed an application for a lease on
an adjoining 40-acre tract, but no lease had yet been issued to hi; .
Eight after Boesche' s filing, Cuccia and Conley applied for a lease on
the entire 120 acres covered by the Boesche and Council applicati
but not yei ivs.„ed to them. Thereafter, in December, 1956, a lea
on . *y-acre tract was issued to Conneil and, in November, 1957, a
95 373U. S. 472.
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lea_~ on the SO-acre tract was issued to Boesche. Cuccia and Conley
ure notified t3 -.. . leir application was rejected, whereupon they pur-
sued - xinistrative appeal, which was successful as to the 80-acre
tract, A lease to them o\ror the 3G-acro tract was* directed in deroga-
tion of the Boesche lease, the actual cancellation o£ which w-s \\ci^ in
abeyance pending appeal.
There was in effect at the time of Boesche' & application
Interior Department regulation saying that offers Tor noncompetitive
leases must cover at least 6-iC acres "except . . .where the land
surrounded by lands not available for leasing under the act." C.
.alie Z. Shell, 62 I. D. 417 (1955), the Court pointed out that "n
available11 in the above regulation had "always been administratively
97
construed to mean lands not available for leasing to z • -.v,ic . M In-
asmuch as the lease to Connell had not yet issued as of Boesche'
s
plication, the 40-acre tract was still "available," and should h -
included in the application. On the basis of this interpretation, Boesche*
a
application was administratively determined to have been invalid ie
lease which resulted from it subject to cancellation.
In t)\Q form considered by the Supreme Court, Boesche' s ti»
9643 c. F. R. § 192.42 (d) (1955).
97 37 3 U. S. at 474.

i-;ii»v* cancellation of Ms le • .-aebai
.. ;ti< ... pal
Lea Act. The
.
a j contended that sec . o exclusi
source oJ the Secretary's authority to cancel le -sea onc< \
a 31 calls for cancellation through judici tl proceed! . ;hc
only exc, . being for case* of noncompliance with lease tei
. ce etitioner's dereliction had not been a failure to com
»se» bu'» rather a failure to co.. ,.:. .... rtn antal r«
a, he contended that a judicial proceeding, an<3 not adrnij iotr •
cellation, was the only course ot actioa open to the Secret try*
/-j u.:iuKf/ex was; that his power to cane el a lease lies
his general powers of management of the pubilc domain. Th
b&ists, ho contended* unless withdrawn by v. e Mineral Le 'h
- ice section 31 requires judicial cancellation only for ,: ast-
eve.vlw affecting a lease, it does not aiToefc the power to cancel a
.....u'-i.vcl/ for pre-lssuance events*
The Court agreed with the Secretary that his general • . . . .
ox management over public lands carried with them the authority
cancel a lease iavalid at its inception, in the absence of a specif;
tory withdrawal of that authority* In support of this proposition,
Opinion cited Cameron y. Unit-..
|
B .-.tes, 2b? U. S. 450 (W9) find .
v. Humboldt ;-i.-.ccr h-U-aia-/. Co., 371 U. S, 334 (1963). Both case

-.trative cancellation of mining claims for which eaten
&d, Petlti gttcd that t mining; claims
. re equitable interests and that the power c. a< minij m can*
lation established by the ca.^-; ~. ,-.. . ,
tl ,t oil and gas leases conveyed interests more closely
. . tgal interest created by land
Isst , ybe cancelled only in the courts. All sough the ;-.
. from very solid common-law groun i, the . . . .
not to accept his argument. It said the characterization o* ;
est conveyed by a lease was not important. Rather, the tmportaj .
Btioa was whether "all authority or control" oveir I
seed from "the Executive Department."'' The Ciu:l Julv _.
authority did not ceaac v.ith the issuance o( a lease.
Unlike a lane patent, which divests the Government of
title, Congress under the Mineral Leasing Act *ia:i not only
reserved to the United States the fee intercut in the h
land, but had al£o subjected tho lease to exacting restrictions
tnd continuous supervision by the Secretary. Thu . sign-
menta and subleases must be approved by 63 cretary, 3
U. S. C. § 137; he may direct complete »u< . snsion of op
on the land, 3u '0. S. C. § 209, or require the lessee to ope
under a cooperative or unit plan, 30 U. S. C. § 226{j); and h<
cribe, as he has* rules and reguiatioi i n mini.
', 11 ail facets of the working of the land, 30 U. S. C. . - -V,
30 C. F, R., ot. 221. In short, a mineral iea^e does not give
?8 373 U. 5. ot 477, q ting Moore v. Robbins, 96 V. S. 53
)
(1377), which stands for the proposition that such control does pa;
from the Executive Department with the issuance of a patent.

the lessee anyth; iing the full ownership ol ..a
,
nor does it convey an unencumb _.., •._ the
As .. matter of statutory construction, the ^ours dctercr
that the port of section 31 of th« sral I 4 ct rcli
n Ired judicial cancellation only tor OQS*»leas« - .
1 . -re, did not affect the Secretary's underlyin
,
power to a
. a liai* tratively ior a pre-ieaae event such as the ct in I
. 1 ise apj ion. Further, the Court pointed out, the Secretar
guently asserted the power to cancel administratively wi
fie statutory authority, and Congress had not acted to curtai* hii er.
'**''''° ' °'^ c '' c
.
opinion concluded with the observation t-
ninistration of both the public domain and the federal cov
: be adversely affected by transferring the power to cane I 1
..rotary xo the courts.* Because of the magnitude oL . .al
h progi .'.'» tha Court i'eit it would be impractical to d the
Secretary the power to correct administrative errors by his ov
1 Court thought its decision would not result in administrate
because, besides administrative rights, final action by the £
would always he open to Judicial review.
The Supreme Court stated that it considered Boesche v.
9<?373 U. S. at 477-73.
*00373 U. S. at 484.
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important for review because, for one reason, there was a "seeming"
conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District
101
oz Columbia Circuit in the same case and the decision of the Court





->-' % v. - --...on . The Supreme Court did not make clear
its opinion whether it saw a real conflict between the two lower c<
decisions. Certainly there is not a nec« / conflict. "
___
the Secretary may cancel a lease for a pre-issuance failure to z
ply viii-i regulations, whereas Pan Arneric. aid he may no
a lease for pre-issuance fraud. The Supreme Court expressly limi-
ecision in Boesche to the type of administrative error actual-
ly present in that case. Therefore, it is possible that Pan A
is still good law for the proposition that administrative cancellation
103
is not open to the Secretary as a remedy for ore-lease fraud. ' ~
ever, v " ~ ; t 2h.s certainly invalidated broad dictum in Fan Amoru: : i to
e effect that the Secretary is completely without authority to cancel
10 l
30-3 F. 2d 204 (D. C. Cir. 1961).
i02234 F. 2d 649 (10th Cir. i960), cert, ^.o^,::;, 366 U. 2 .
(1961).
See Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Udall, 352 F. 2d
(10th Cir. 1965), which upheld an administrative cancellation for £
ure to disclose an agency relationship existing prior to Issuance in




for pre-lea ,. 1U* \. hatever the doubta about its continuing
Vi
, . -
orican remains of interest for our purposes becau,
Judge Breitenstein's opinion in the case summarizes the argument:;
many lawyers and oilmen have advanced against the kind o£ reasc.
ia by the -u;,i'eme Court in Boeschv? v. Udalh
In that case the % yoming State Supervisor of the Bureau of
3—id Management had alleged that one Davis had fraudulently obtaii
tfice and assignment of federal oil ^i\c\ gaa lease; i the ir-
pose of exceeding acreage limitations, without disclosing an agency
relationship! and ac a time when Davis was not qualified to hold 1
The Supervisor brought a proceeding to cancel Davis' leases in the
g office of the Bureau of Land Management. Pan American,
- holder of some of the leases by assignment, was given notice
the proceeding. Before the date set for the proceeding, Pan American
brought suit in the United States District Court seeking to enjoin c^.,-
of the leases by administrative action. It alleged that the
was no authority to cancel federal leases by administrative actio..
that any such action, taken without authority, would cause It , reat
id result in the taking of its property without due proc
The court agreed that, authority to cancel the leases by administrative
action was lacking.
Holmborg, .v. ora note 90, at 317-22.

Ao the Secretary of the Interior did later in Eoosche v. Ud'll,
the officers of the Bureau of Land Management center... haX the
power to cancel leases for pre-issuauce fraud inhered in the Secre-
tary's general power of supervision of public laiida and fchat sections
27 and 31 of the Minora! Leasing Act had no application. In an»w<
to this contention, the court pointed out that the lease system or di -
posing of public mineral lands was preceded by a ..
of ail public lands, i*.cluu.;ij mineral lands, by patent. Issuance -..
a patent terminates administrative control over public 1
court did not feel there were differences between patents and leai .
..oat to justify their being treated differently, without some .
lative expression to that effect. In the words of Jud^o Breit in:
We ddon'x it unnecessary to delve into the legal complex! ti
as to whether an oil and gas lease grants a profit a prendre or
creates an estate in land. Under tho first theory the lessee
ins title to the oil and gas after its severance and under the
second the lessee has an ownership of the hydrocarbons in
place* Under each theory tho government, by tho issuance
the lease, has performed the last act required of it to vest in
the lessee the right to explore for, produce, market and sell
s oil and gas underlying the leased premises. Similarly
the issuance of a patent is the last act of the government in
disposing of tho non-mineral lands in the public domain. Up-
on the performance of this last act, administrative power
to annul or cancel ends and judicial power begins. *05
Except for cases of failure to comply with lease terms, nowhere in
the Mineral Leasing Act did Congress authorise cancellation c
'
i05 234 F. 2d at 654-55.

by other than judicial action.
The Pan American opinion also ecaphaeiscd the impairment
to the practical operation of t —»al Leasing Act which would re-
sult from administrative cancellations of leases for fraud in
procurement. Secure titleo are of extreme importance to oil and
. -w, who must take substantial financial risks in order to
obtain and market production. A seders* 2e^„c becomes a very In-
Secure foundation for title if it is made to depend on flucu
,,
£ov ntal policies which could result in action adverse to the
lease without limit as to time.
The Pan American opinion considered the earlier case
.
..-' v. V-. ahlenraaier, decided in the District of Columbia Circu
but concluded that it offered no help in reaching a decision. In Wahlen-
mr.icr the application for a federal lease which was second in time
had bee., rejected by the bureau of .Land Management and a leace
sued to the earlier applicant. Alleging that the earlier applicant \.
not qualified under statute and regulation, the later applicaa . te
have the lease cancelled and a new lease issued to him. The Die
Court cancelled the first lease and the Court of Appeals affirmed, say-
ing that tho Secretary of the Interior had the power to cancel the lea;
and should have done so administratively in the first instance.
106226 F. 2d 35 (D. C. Cir. 1955).
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The V; aMc: - ' t decision was considered by the Pan ' r«
w^w^c to bo io^ppiicoblo to the lev- L^v^v. •.'„ boouuso the case ac-
tually resulted in judicial and not administrative cancellation. However,
—.smuch as W ahlenraaicr reached its result by doing what it said the
Secroo-ry should havu cc^c in vV— iov^t place, a Ending Chat the Secre-
tary had the power of administrative cancellation wu«
decision. This finding was reached without difficulty t court,
the Secretary bod ooubtj about whether bo coo.d cancel, -or -. ^.V.„.. :„
th© lease application, " . . .in view of the existing legal relationship
<jl lc.:-or nod lo^woo botv^ooo. the Government and [tbo ..rat applies tj,
..." Ho resolved his doubts in favor of the power to cancel ado-.
107
tratively for pre-lcase violations of statute or regulation. The
court had no doubts, and even felt the Secretary took an unduly re-
stricted view of his own powers. Without citation of authority, the
court stated in a footnote to its opinion that it thought the Secretary
had the right to cancel a lease "irnprovidently issued" whether or not
there was a violation of statute or regulation, especially "when fraud,
deception or concealment caused the lease to be issued."*^* This
court's case in resolving an issue which was to cause so much contro-
versy in later years might be explained by the fact that the holder of
Q^Id. at 42, quoting the decision of the Secretary of the In-
terior in the same case. Hill v. Culbortson (unpublished).




••- — - -
.
•
- ot a party to the action. Neither act.
had strong interest* in upholding the ls,~^w in issue.
Some doubts as to the Secretary's power seem to have
a*iij«n in the District of Columbia Circuit by ...
Co. was decided. " In that case the lease in question had been c
celled administratively on grounds of noncompliance *
prior to issuance ol the lease. The Secretary's action was struck
down on the ground that it constituted clearly improper admlnist; -
vlvw action* Thus* the question of his general power i t s< .. .
was avoided by the court. However, an earlier opinion in the car.
filed in 1957 and later withdrawn, had said the Secretary was with*
out power to cancel for pre-lease events. The \ awn opinion
3h proceeded on the land patent analogy which was also used in I
Av.z- • Petroleum Corp. v. Picrson, supra, and was rejected in
Bcsseho v. '%J<: 11, supra.
It has been observed that there is inevitable conflict be*
10twoon administrative convenience and common-law stability. while
the law seeks to define and protect rights of property through rul
of due process, the concern of the administrator is rather with effi-
ciency and the greatest good for the majority. When the line of ca
I09256 F. 26 718 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
i -.
Holmberg, i unra note 90, at 314.
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» a heavy weight was placed in the balance on I
side ^* uv;.'.u..»wv^t.vc convenience. TLe decision freed the Secretary
of the Interior to cancel valuable federal leases foi* defective corn
ance, during an unlimited length of time before issuance, with r«
lions the meaning of which depend upon his own virtually unfetter..
interpretation. The only better on his interpretations is the lease
112
right to judicial review. But that right must now be of small com-
fort to a lessee whose title depends on tiosc interpretations. The
courts frequently emphasise that administrative officers' iaterprs
tions of the statutes they are charged with administering must bo
treated with great deference on review. The administrator must
" plainly wrong," or "unreasonable.*** * As was pointed out pre-
viously, the Supreme Court stated in UdaH v. Tatlman that an ad-
ministrator's construction of a regulation is entitled to even more
deference on review than his construction of a statute. Such a con-
111 37 3 U. S. 472 (1963).
^%ee generally Jaffe, The Riirht to Judicial Rcvi-v/, 7
1
HARV. L. REV. 401-37, 769-3H (195S).
il3McKenna v. Seaton, 259 F. 2d 760, 734 (D. C. Cir. 1*/
-. :-t. denied. 35 S U. S. a 35 (1953),
114Chapman v. Santa Fe P. R.R., m F.2d 493, 502 (D. C.
Cir. 1951), cert, denied, 343 U.S. 964(1952).
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•tw etion is "of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous i
lisincoaolatent with the regulation." "*
,-.;.'o,?vcj v. t7c.aU, in tli© course of denying the analogy be-
- - •
..
*s leases and land pateutc, said that federal lease
no: divest the Government of title.**" In upholding the &eeretary*s
exclusion of leases from the category of instruments effecting -
loaa" of public ian<!s, Udall v. Taltraan said they do not "vest
title to the land© in the lessee. 11 **' These statements make i», d~'
ful • sr the federal lessee car* still claim that he has right
property protected by cue process* U he does not have such
but •„ ,s the status only of a licensee, tl »ave d«
violence to common-law traditions stet
„ from concept*
tity of contract in general and of the Interest created bji
e oil leases in particular. But an assessment of the effect
administrative cancellation on the domestic Saw of the United States is
beyond the scope o£ this paper. We now turn to a consideration of .. .
effects it might have on the legal environment *>* tlie overseas ©** c
cession.
115 380 U.S. at 16-17,
116373U.S. at477-7S.
117 3S0 U.S. at 19.

ADMINISTRATIVE CANCELLATION AND T!
OVERSEAS CONCESSION
C~~- Ive Loav View of the Fo.' .. - ;. .Lear,
'-^calliaj the discussion of concessions, we can readily see
-re -re vaony avenues by which municipal law rules foreign to
the contracting state car* cater the arena ci dispute over an oil
jssion. This is true whother the arena is an arbitration
tribunal eet up pursuant to the terras oi the concession agr«
self or a regularly constituted tribunal o- an invcri »1 or domestic
nature. Such foreign law may enter a dispute directly in two sitv.
whore a choice of lav/ rule of private international law points to t
of come foreign state, say that of the company's incornc.
proper law for construction of some part of the concession contr
or where a concession contract specifics some body of for- 1-
cipal law as applicable to it. The former situation is unlikely to occur*
inasmuch as concession contracts are ordinarily negotiated, sig:
and contemplate performance within the contracting state. The _ i
situation is more common, and is exemplified by the specificatiO!




of 1954. The indirect avenues for the entry of foreign law into
cession disputes arc more numerous.
Y. e have seen how the legal environment of the conce
may include public international law. It may enter concession dis-
putes which arise from unilateral action by the contracting state
taken in such a way as to constitute an inten ational delict. Ever*
in the absence of delictual state conduct, international I y - \ -
ply to disputes under the view that concession contracts are lnh<
ly international in character. The concession's legal environ?
•may w-~«i include t. e general principles of law recogsn by civi-
— ca nations. They may be included in their own right as a i
body of law or as a source for the rules of public internatio
Either international law or the general principles of law -may be ,
fied in the concession as being applicable. In that case they enter t
decision of disputes under the £uise of the !•-: • • .•• : -zi\- r.. Even
where the local law of the contracting state is held to be exclusiv
applicable, rules from international law and the general principles
are frequently incorporated into it in order to fill gaps in its develop-
ment.
Municipal law is an important source of the rules of put
international law. International lav/ uses the rules of municipal law
applicable to individuals within particular states iu derive, by a
no
**°See p> 12 s»ora t
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process of analogy, rules applicable to states in their dealings w;
each other. » Almost by definition, the "principles of law rcco
by civilised nations' 1 is made up largely of rules distilled from the
common elements ^1 the various municipal legal 8]
The law>..' ^ .arching among municipal legal system a for
38 ww Include within the internatic iw or general princif/.
law applicable to conceaoions would find United its
espoc...--; persuasive, if not almost contr< > The
virtually the only largo, developed country which has a long history
of oil and gas production within its own borders. Consequently, it
has by far the best developed system of municipal law dealing with
that subject. Moreover, United States corporations control a vast
share of world oil production under concession agreements made with
them or their subsidiaries. It would be extremely difficult for such a
corporation to argue the irrelevance of an American precedent to
construction of its concession. Conversely, it seems inevitable t.
those representing the Interests of the state would ar&'ec lov the I
elusion of American law within the body of law application to the con-
cession, if that law were favorable to their position. America.
dents authorizing administrative cancellation of federal leases wc
11 9Sc rally H. LAUTERFACHT, PRIVATE LAW
: RC TS AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1927), wl
convincingly refutes the highly philosophical objections to this vie
based on pooitivict concepts of sovereignty.

to
favor their position. That is the conclusion of this paper. To tr-
the route by which it to reached, we must resort to the technique s of
th© comparative lawyer.
The comparison, in this instance, will be between Unit
States municipal law on cancellation of federal Icaj^u and vac tradi-
tional rules of international law protecting the sanctity of contracts.
As international law is partly a synthesis of the elements common Co
the law of civilized nations, American municipal law is to some extent
ancestral to international law. If the comparison shows, ac I believe
it does, that administrative cancellation docs not accord with I
traditional rules of international law (or general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations), it endangers the sane of inter) -
tional concession agreements. The international rules protecting the
concoction's sanctity become subject to redefinition if it turns oul
one of the premises upon which they are theoretically based, the import-
ant body of municipal law in force in America, is not what it has been
supposed to be.
Historically, unilateral state action affecting concesoioii
contracts has contemplated either complete abrogation* or a lesser
modification of the original agreement. An example of complete abro-
gation is the 195 1 nationalization by Iran of the interests of the Ai
Iranian Oil Coonpany. The nationalization came about as the r of
-An^io-Iranian's refusal, with British Government, support* to srenego-
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tiafce its very old concession go as to give Iran a royalty comparable
to that being received by surrounding states, which had granted con-
120
cessions at a later date. V» e have already encountered an example
of a state attempt to effect a lesser modification of a concession in .
facts underlying tl\Q Saudi Arabia-Aramco arbitration. In another
more recent example, a Libyan royal decree in direct conflict with
the terms of concession agreements then in effect was acquiesced in
by the concessionary oil companies operating in that country. It is
the traditional practice of the international oil business for ro
to sell their oil at varying discounts off a "posted" price.
price is a fictitious figure and sale prices never actually
royal c ecree, made in 1965, called for an income tax to be base
the posted price, not on the price the concessionaires actually received
for their oil. Despite the fact that the concessions stated e.
that no amendment or repeal of Libyan law subsequent to 1961 coi
alter the companies' rights without their consent, the com panic ..;-
ted their reluctant corsent to modify the concessions in accordance
with the decree. Their consent was obtained through various govern-
mental threats. Chief among them was a threat to bar all export*
i20B. SHWADRAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, OIL- AND Tl
GREAT POWERS 103-52 (1955).
*2 l





Whether the state completely abrogates the concession or
only invades some lesser right grantee by it, it will usually justify
.
.
under some theory of the rights and dutie i of sovereignty,
or by arguing that the concession does not in fact grant the right
contended for by the company. The latter type of argument nc.
detain us. International judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals evahr
such arguments using rulea of construction similar to those with
which every American lawyer is familiar. The theories of
eignty used to advance U\g proposition that the state has absolu
power over concession contracts have been discussed earlier.
Bach body of "non-national law" (to coin a term denoti
the bodies of law, except for municipal law, which may apply to ... in*
ternational contract) previously discussed contains the princi
°ac-a r.i nt servanda and the doctrine of acquired rights. Taken to-
gether, these two great principles are the arsenal providing vi
all the weapons a lawyer must use to fight on the side of sanctity of
123
international contracts. A lawyer representing the state cc;
122
J. HARTSHORN, OLL COMPANIES AND GOVERN
17-26 (1967).
* 2 3See HAY 47, which substitutes "the contract is the I
oi the parties" for the doctrine of acquired rights.
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lock-up the arsenal, or blunt the edges of hie opponents' weapons, by
that United States law does not recognize those principle
on the municipal level, in situations analogous to concvo^.o.; disputes.
It may readily be seen that the closest analogue of the
overseas oil concession within the United States is the federal oil
i&b _^»e. Doth the federal *v~^e and the c< .volvc a
u'^te on one side and a private party on the other. They be
,ect matter hydrocarbons owned by the go
party, and they both seek io deal with that subject matter in the b
way.
The United Slates Government in is. . 1 . i
foreign government in granting a concession have the same moti\ . .
Thoy want development of the national hydrocarbon resources an<
they want revenue. They have decided to satisfy these objectives by
attracting orivate capital to the task of development ana retaining ^
share of any oil and gas produced. It is true that underdevelopei
countries have little choice about adopting a system which will at-
tract foreign private capital to the development of their resource .
The United States, unlike them, is not necessarily forced to seek - .-
eign'or even private capital. The fact remains, however, that it -
chosen a method of resource development very similar to the over-
seas concession.

It goes almost without saying that the motives of the pri*
vat
., the federal lessee and the concessionaire, are the
came. They hope to find enough oil and gas to ropay the expenses
of development and yield a profit.
With a similarity of objectives underlying both the con-
cession and the federal lease, it is not surprising that they are es-
sentially similar in form. They both grant a right to explore for
and gas over a specific area for a specific time, during whic
payments are called for. They both continue in effect after the -
sxploration, provided profitable production exists. The fe
lease continues indefinitely, whereas the concession is ordinarily
id io a very long term of years. Eoth reserve a royalty to tl
government, measured by the amount of production. Federal 1
and overseas concessions are similar enough to have been group<
together in the expression "concession - leasing system.'
If the motives of the parties and the forms of the conces-
sion and the federal lease are similar, the expectations each par
has concerning the party on the other side of each agreement arc
similar. The United States Government and the foreign governm
:
expect that the private party will bqtvq his own self-interest and
124
Carlston, supra note 3, at 622.

. rofit, thereby effecting the purpose of the lease or concession.
the -...or side, the private parties expect that the government will
keep them secure in their title, thereby making a profit possible and
a large investment prudent. That expectation en the part of the fc
se has heon shaken by United States Supreme Court approval of
administrative cancellation for pre-lease events;. The expectation
of the overseas concessionaire would also be shaken, were that
cial approval to be translated into "non-national" terms.
•t for Attacks on the Concession
We now turn to an assessment of the effect of adtr .
cellation in the United States on '' ack .•:.-.-:- . .- .-v it " .-. and the
trine of acquired rights as found in the several systems of "non-
law," But before doing so, and before coming down too hare on tl
cases approving administrative cancellation, it would be wise to <
in a general way, United States law on the binding nature of state con-
tracts as it existed prior to those cases. This is especially necessa:
bee use earlier decisions of the United States Supreme Court have ac-
tually been cited in support of the proposition that a sovereign stats may
legally repudiate its contracts.
The citations referred to are found in Frank I-Tendryx' l c. .
125




"ne..-—lonal lawM ho espoused for concession contracts was interna**
tional law, which he defined for that content as the common practice of
--
'. , France, and fh« Ua... j. Citing ~ix Supreme Court
cases, he asserted United States lav/ supported his cone]
. . . the purpose for which governments c . the service of t)
.
. quires that on proper occi. U iG.'; those governmei
must be released from or bo able to override, their contractual
obligations. So atxong is this requireme; \ It .... ...
Constitutional provisions, which would ap
sibility of release.
e Constitutional provisions which Hendryx subordinates to a
. right to avoid state contracts are, of course, the prohib
inst the taking of property without due process of law found in
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United a Constitution*
Mowever, Hendryx' conclusion about United States law i
not ou^portcd by the cases he cites. Only two of the cases, Douglas v.
127 i? >
•..i:.. an*.' V..-\y Yoi-a c: N. £. U.K.. v. Bristol , actually involve
types of state contracts; a lottery grant and a railroad charter, r
sly. The Court upheld a state revocation of the grant In Pougla
a state modification of grade crossing regulations in Bristol. '• h
Court felt both cases arose from valid exercises of state police power
to protect tho public health and morals. The cases stand only for th
l26U. S, CONST, amends. V, XIV. S i.
127 163 U. S. 488 (1397).
123 151 U. S. 556 (1394).

Y-
proposition that rights of prop* rty are subject, even .
ution, to police power. They «
-•-' c- nc
- govern ....... has a right to repudi .
tr ' •
'
-' lt "°*u b0 to th« people's best inuvnti - econo*
in; !
- <**<* - *°* it to do so. Thi er £our cases he cited
were not in point, dcalii
....
as they did with
n siatc action af*ectia8 tbeai.
1^
z$ has been ofc i g
pyx oid no; cite the 1935 c^o oi -,-; v. i
S
hat the Government has the power to








endryx" pronouncements met with very lit
;al when they were made. 3l They £i ! not reflect prevail*
nion on the t
. Lnci :^~ or "non-national law" in general,
sn.did they reflect a i?^ picture o£ United States la\
•'• •-•- li*e Supreme Court c^c* on administrative cancels
.
B. Uorthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U. S. 426 (1934);
... Brown Holding Co. v. Feldmaa, Zj« U. S~. 170 (Kv I]
v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1HS7); Pierce v. New Hampshire, 46 U. S.
(3 oww.) 504 (ii>47).
*^tCissam U L,each, supra note ?., at 202, citln Perry v.
Vr.;tcc States, 294 U. S. 330. 352 (1935).

?2
been available to Hendryx la 1959* Ma thesis would ha ,_-.
-..u..www^ c/aalLficatlaoi will fee Is order ;«wr a. ........ , _
statement that V -'- - v. Udall stands on the si^w
.
— apposed to the traditional uards of |
132
is beyond doubt. The Court's concern for administrative efficiency
is explicit:
Recognition of the Secretary's -psv/cr here corves to nr<
the public Interest ia the administration of the public dc i i
Cancellation of thic :..a;l v.;
* st to regulations designed to check tho undue split!
tracts* which might facilitate Crauds, bin I $t the dev< .
of oil and gas resources* and render supervision very burden*
. ome. **
This iavocation of "public interest" to support aa administrator"
cancellation of a lease sounds very much like a „Uc echo c£
what, in the "non-national" context of a concession dispute, would
be a claim of sovereign right aad duty. A sovereign right to over-
ride its owa earlier law, that is, aad a correlative duty to do so when-
ever the interests of its citizens would bo advanced thereby. I, ;r»
the abovo quoted statement does not reflect the ceatral holding el the
case aad would, therefore, be but weak support for the proposition
that the United States Supreme Court has aligned Itscl- with the a.
ing theories of absolute sovereignty found in the realm of coacc
132





.._\.wiu. iviuch more certain it ... that tho excision undermines the
traditional safeguards of costs-act and property rights, thus helpi:
to pave the way for the successful assertion of theories of sovu
ri^ht. Either expressly or by implication tho Court's opinion d
the protection of the domestic equivalents of Pacta sunt servanda and
the doctrine of acquired rights to the domestic instrument most close-
ly analogous to the overseas concession.
Tho common-law manifestation of the doctrine of acquir
rights in the United States federal system finds statement in the
s-ataUeaai rcc^wircvnc-it what ^vc^a^ou^i action affecting propei :;
ri^ats mast bo in accordance with clao process* Lessee attempts to
analogize the federal lease to a laud patent, coupled with invocati
of Constitutional due process to protect it, were, viewed from tho out-
side, simply attempts on the municipal level to show that the federal
lease is property of the sort protected by t\\Q doctrine of acquis
rights. Such an analogy was offered to the court in Pan Amcrlc
134
l-'otroleum Corp. v» Piemen and accepted, with the consequence
that a federal lease was found to be immune from administrative can-
collation not specifically authorized by law. Offered to the District
of Columbia Circuit, the same analogy was rejected, with the conse-
quence that cancellation for a pre-Iease event was upheld as an
i34 2G4 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. I960).
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ribute of the general governmental power over public lands, .-,:>
& through the agency of the stary of the Interior. In
the course of resolving this MBeemin&n conflict in favor of the 1st*
position, the Supreme Court expressly rejected not only tl
tent analogy* but any other characterisation of .. .
. il leai




The Court considered it unimportant to say whs ;al
..est was created by a federal oil and ^as lease. Hox ever*
Court did say what it felt that interest was not. It was not an i:
eat free of administrative control, oven to the point of be I ject
to termination without specific legislative or judicial authority. '.'
Court felt this conclusion followed from the facts that leases do not
divest the United States of the full fee in the land or the underlying
minerals and that the Mineral Leasing Act directs the Secretary of
the Interior to supervise operations on tha land during the life of
lease. In other words* the interest of the federal lessee, althe
deniabiy an interest in real property, is not the sort of intcrcv .led
to have its terminal event identified only by courts of law, which ale
I353oesch© v. Udall, 303 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
l^Boeache v. Udall, 373 U, S. 472, 477-70 (1963).
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can rule in accordance with duo process of law, Rather, becau
never rij .ato a fail fee in lane c arals ...— - .s is Is si -
joe. tatutory con<Utions, U _ ^.^l..- subject to termin
fcive action upon the occurrence of conditio t 01
This conclusion of the Supreme Cot.. Id Lose v.
sa to ''non-national'* terms* L »ral lease, tl
overseas concession never ripen. -;..,.s 1
—
j sort o- iao. ;..._ ..•..:* :.
docs not approach a fee as closely ~s dees the federal lease bec ... .
its term is not indefinite during production but rather Is a t
.' years. Also Ilk* the federal lease, the conceas ...
contains specific, continuing conditions dealing with opera
lowing the earn© linn of reasoning u-cu by the Supreme Cera
Boeache, an<5 relying on its contribution to the appl. - wo^y c*
M
»on«siai2e»alM law, the government's advocate in a concession dis-
pute could argue that the inheres* o* the concessionaire, however -.
might be characterised, is not of the sort projected by the doec*
of acquired rights from unilateral termination by the state.
The potential damage done by Z *•.'. ',..'.<.?. v. Udall to the ".: . n-
national" maxim '•• *";:. c^-it ccrv ' is leas obvious than its d
to the doctrine of acquired rights. However, taej possibility o* «
to the former can be found in the opinion by a process of inference.
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. lyom the opinion exactly how, logically, the Court avoids
cing the lease. The opinion is silent on whatever contractual m
kse may have* The Court does not say it is a contract, but,
--• ^
. ..../,.._ ..„.: ^ Cv...;,.v,;, V!.o C\
cc onmon-law equivalent of the doctriv.** of acquired rights by i
prcfcoly classifying the lessee's interest a© something o1
vested property right* But it did not, In a similar way, avoi I
common*! . .•/uivalont of P;~cta ;-">: ;- *•.-.• •- . ' i by cla
lease, expressly at leaat, as something other than a contract, 1 -
silence of the opinion on the contractual nature of the leai i it
sry to explore two alternative routes the Court could . .
low-.. avoiding enforcement of the lease. Cae such re.
to deny the federal lease the status of a contract and to bar it tl
fore from being enforced ao euch. The cher route would be to
the lease ih® status of a contract but to imply terms into
allow cancellation by the governmental party in a fact site itioi !
that prQQQnt in the case. Either route can explain live re. ...
v. t?daU, and the logical consequences of either route car* Lav.'.- 1
sunt r.oryvvsda as a safeguard of the overseas concession.
If, as seems likely, the Court views the federal lease as
something other than a contract, we are almost forced to conch
that it has been reduced to the status of a revocable licence. We have
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wl.-wv-^y acia that U-o : - —'- opinion largely eliminates the only
other ^teraative* that of a vested property interest. There are
«-c t;joi which court© will protect from revocation under certain
circumstances. However* to be so protected they must contain, in
addition to permission to do something* some element of contr;
tual ^ x*4 or of proprietary interest in the subject matter of
the license. Since we have eliminated the former elem<
poses of discussion* and since the Court Itself apparently eliml i
ths «vi;i' clement* we have left to consider only the s'evocable
'•bare" license. 1 '"
U the Supreme Court has in 6»ct classified C;« .cv.
.... ..
...,..'w Iis.c»wC, .... . -cation of what effect a translation of that
classification into * ,*3MMa««c.'uoaalM terms might have on the pjrot . ..-
tion offered the concession by Pcc*-~± r;v-.nt coi-v virtually i
itself. Viewed as a license* the * concession could claim
under the maxim because it is inapplicable by definition to a u :-
tion having no contractual aspects. The oil company operatti
a concession license* as opposed to a concession contract, could* lil
the federal lessee* look only to local statutes and administrative regu-
lations to determine the extent of his license. That determination
would be exceedingly difficult if the local adminisv . 's intc.
133See generally 1A SUMMERS* supra note 77, at ! 154,

Vv
.. of hia regulations were accorded the latitude there that ci
srpretafcione are accorded here. This point will be discussed in
more detail shortly. For now, suffice it to say that whatever h
a cojk .wi-license might get from local administrative re
lid be without assistance from Facta nvT.t cc-vv; ' . .
i
,x
^lIvAv»u^ the second rout© by which the Supreme Co . .
have denied judicial enforcement of the lease in h< v* IHWW<I| I ' M il III MlllilMWM.WI. «*».,
-e the federal lease is a contract and attempt to identify
basic characteristics of the rule Cue Court formulated in order
feet ii.u oeui&L
The terma of the federal U iae «-- a contract are not f<
ca^rely, or even ^rinaarUy*- within the Instrument itself. Instea<
,
they are largely spelled out hy the Mineral Leasing Act, which, to-
gether with the administrative ro^uiatio^i. validly iseucd pur t to
it, sutu the con< Itions of the Government's promise and the reqi Ire*
meats for the ieouce's performance* Exact meaning is given t<
contractual terms by the law of the land, which, in the Unite*
is synonymous with court decisions applying former precedent and
enacted legislation. By reference to court decisions construing stat-
utes and defining the bounds o* administrative discretion, the rpec*
tive lessee should be able to discover the meaning and predict i
cToct of any lease ho may enter into. Since entry into a contract . 1
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relati hip presumes consent by the parties and since valid con-
ycni rc-ruires knowledge oi what is being consented to, the existence
of a lease*contract presupposes that the leasee knew or was able to
ciacovv,.- the meaning of his act through an ex* >n of the la .
That presupposition was not made by the Court in I a '.-. ?. y. ' '
The decision inserted a term in federal leasei .
the lessees could not have ascertained from the law of the land,
lessee in that case was held, in effect, to have cor.. .. to a lea
term allowing administrative cancellation for pre-leaae events .
in fact he could not have done so. When his lease was issued the
Cwul.'. not have consented in fact to be bound by a secretary
interpretation not yet made, nor could, he have consented construc-
tively to a future interpretation which would not have to accord with
the law he is presumed to know. Thus, if the lease is viewed as a
contract, the Court in the Boccch 5 case simply denied it enforces:
by implying a term it could not logically contain.

concl^j:on and recommendation
When the Secretary of the Interior exceeded the author*.
:.i by the Mineral Leasing Act and cancelled federal leases
for aot specified in the law, he violated basic common-:
protections of vzztod property rights and contracts. V hen the
Su i Court confirmed such a canccllatic a v. UdaM.
important weapon was placed in the hands of those wb< \ to
remove the analogous foreign oil concession from the rotectic
the international equivalents of those common-law doctrines. A<
ing this American precedent through any of the avenues by v. hit
municipal lav/ can enter the construction of a concession agr<
the proponents of inherent state power to abrogate or modify cc- :
sions can gain valuable support. They can cite a case from our hi;
court which denies to the domestic analog of the concession us
of an instrument conferring a vested property right. This woul
strong retort to arguments supporting the concession on an ac«;
rights theory. They can cite the same caoo for «ve proposition
our law would not view the concession as a contract; probably onl / ...








T.-c solution Co the problem probably v,_„j not lie within
- • Boeaoetence of Congress, Certainly* id be a relatively
..:-_• Jar Congress to cur© the imsnc. evil la our etc 1 i ic




&H. Such a cu
be
.
:.~ctcd by an amendment to tho Mineral Leasing Act cpellin
...... —it for resort to judicial . all cv
:iflc categories of cancellations could ev.
cretary acting alone, if that were the desis ' Congr n • A 3
those categories are described in tl - ••• with partic
os* title in federal leases would not be shaken, althoag'
leases themselves might become lose attractive. But, desirs
thii . isl-itive remedy might be from a donv otic point, it
probably would not obviate the difficulty we have traced for the
holders ©I overseas oil concessit.
Viewed from afar, from the standpoint of oae who is analyt-
ics of the American concept of law to discover its eff




o decision would remain oven after the domestic co::
of the decision had been erased through legislation. What the int ; -
natloaal practitioner would be seeking in his examination of the
Ss XtO'i precedent in tho strict sez^se, but rather authoritati




. says after the decision, the opinion remain* and* comi;
from the £ ipre se Court* the final ... „ce in tho
. would certainly thoritative.
'©r to the internatio prot
...
- the law of administrative cancellation of the federal S
?re, it lies with fuv;'..ci* action '
.2.x body can. in a proper future case, ovzxv^ I . i
or clarify what it appears to have uttered by way of opinion on
beiic nature of the federal oil and gas lease* -'.
loft itself the opportunity to take such future action by con*
I decision in I pi che v. | all c y to tho facts pr<
A slightly changed fact situation could give the Court a c]
clear that it has not aligned itself with a legal /,:..
would broadly deny the federal lease the ©tatuc of a v ...x
its; . nee or of a contract with terms defined by law.
At any rate, this ia whut 1 recommend, race
more in the nature of a plaint than a recommendation*
1
' 11 is a shot apparently not yet "heard 'round the world," but an*
i corrective action is taken, its reverberation© will com.
awaiting only receptive ears*
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